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1 Introduction
How should we understand knowledge-how – knowledge how to do some-
thing? And how is it related to knowledge-that – knowledge that something
is the case?1 In this paper, I will discuss a very important and influential as-
pect of this question, namely the claim – dubbed ‘Intellectualism’ by Gilbert
Ryle (1945, 1949) – that knowledge-how can be reduced to knowledge-that.
Recently, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001) have tried to estab-
lish Intellectualism with the aid of linguistic considerations. This project –
Linguistic Intellectualism – will be criticized on three levels. First, I will re-
construct and object to Stanley & Williamson’s positive argument in favour
of Intellectualism (section 2). Second, I will assess their view of the rela-
tionship between knowledge-how and practical ability and argue that their
stance is not well-motivated (section 3). Third, I will discuss their criticism
of Ryle’s objection against Intellectualism. After distinguishing between dif-
ferent versions of Ryle’s argument, I will show that its strongest version is
both immune to the objection by Stanley & Williamson and a decisive argu-
ment against their own theory (section 4). Given that Intellectualism fails
for these three reasons, I finally draw on a broader reading of Ryle in order
to develop the beginnings of a positive account of knowledge-how and its
relationship to knowledge-that (section 5).
1It should be briefly noted that not every use of “knows that” indicates knowledge-that
and not every use of “knows how” indicates knowledge-how. For example, “She knows that
person” does not indicate knowledge-that, and “He knows how long the journey takes”
does not indicate knowledge-how. For various other uses of “knows how” which do not
indicate knowledge-how, compare Bengson et al. (2009, 389).
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2 Linguistic Intellectualism
2.1 The Argument from Linguistics
In the words of Gilbert Ryle, champions of Intellectualism hold that “the
primary exercise of minds consists in finding the answers to questions” (Ryle
1949, 27). Stanley & Williamson fit this bill precisely. Their argument
in favour of Intellectualism (2001) relies on the idea that knowledge-how
consists in knowing the answer to a question, namely the question which
is syntactically ‘embedded’ in the sentence attributing knowledge-how. For
example, if Gregor knows how to ride a bicycle, linguists tell us that the
expression ‘how to ride a bicycle’ is an embedded version of a question like
“How can one ride a bicycle?” Then, to say that Gregor knows how to ride
a bicycle is just to say that Gregor knows an answer to such a question,
that he knows that such-and-such would be a way for him to ride a bicycle.
Since this knowledge is knowledge-that, Stanley & Williamson conclude that
knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that.
It is crucial to note that this argument begins with an account not of
knowledge-how, but of ascriptions of knowledge-how. These, the claim goes,
are best understood in terms of embedded questions. The reason is simple:
Our view of ascriptions of knowledge-how is very straightforward.
It is just that the standard linguistic account of the syntax and
semantics of embedded questions is correct. (2001, 431)
I will not give a full account of the linguistic theories Stanley & Williamson
cite in order to get their argument going (compare 2001, 417-432). However,
let me label the linguistic theory they rely on the Karttunen Account –
in honor of their central point of reference, an article by Lauri Karttunen
(1977) – and indicate briefly that its core idea is a unified explanation of the
semantics of ‘to know’ followed by an interrogative particle:
Hannah knows where to find a nickel.
Hannah knows whom to call for help in a fire.
Hannah knows why to vote for Gore.
(examples from Stanley & Williamson 2001, 417 f.)
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All of these are accounted for in terms of knowledge-that as an answer to an
embedded question: Hannah knows where to find a nickel just in case she
knows, for some place x, that x is a place where to find a nickel. This is an
answer to the question “Where to find a nickel?” By the same token, Hannah
knows why to vote for Gore just in case she knows, for some reason r, that
r is a reason why to vote for Gore. This is an answer to the question “Why
vote for Gore?”
Stanley & Williamson merely add that this theory of knowledge-wh –
knowledge-where, knowledge-whom, and so on – can be extended in order to
include a further interrogative particle: “how”. Thus, what they derive from
the Karttunen Account is that
[“Hannah knows how to ride a bicycle.”] is true if and only if, for
some contextually relevant way w which is a way for Hannah to
ride a bicycle, Hannah knows that w is a way for her to ride a
bicycle. (Stanley & Williamson 2001, 426)
Generally speaking, they hold that “S knows how to F” is true if and only
if, for some contextually relevant way w which is a way for S to F, S knows
that w is a way for them to F.2 This is obviously a claim about the truth
conditions of “S knows how to F”, but Stanley & Williamson go on to infer
a claim about knowledge-how and knowledge-that, Intellectualism. I will
call this argument the Argument from Linguistics. This is how it works in
detail:
1 Linguistics determines that “S knows how to F” is true if and only
if S knows an answer to the question “How to F?”
2 Linguistics determines that S knows an answer to the question
“How to F?” if and only if, for some contextually relevant way w
2Sometimes it is true that somebody knows how to do something, but it may be impos-
sible to specify a way to do so because the activity is too complex. David Wiggins (2005)
has proposed several such examples and even argued that in such cases, we have little
reason “to believe that there is some simple propositional knowable that spells out the
whole set of complete procedures which would somehow comprise and exhaust” a person’s
knowledge-how (Wiggins 2005, 271). I sympathize with this worry, but I will neverthe-
less grant the existence and knowability of such propositions for the sake of Stanley &
Williamson’s argument.
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which is a way for S to F, S knows that w is a way for them to F.
3 Thus, linguistics determines that “S knows how to F” is true if
and only if, for some contextually relevant way w which is a way
for S to F, S knows that w is a way for them to F.
4 If Linguistics determines that “S has the property P” is true if
and only if S has the property Q, then P is Q.
5 Thus, knowledge how to F is, for some contextually relevant way
w, knowledge that w is a way to F.
6 Knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that if and only if knowl-
edge how to F is, for some φ, knowledge that φ(F ).
7 Thus, knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that.
The first part of this argument, premises 1 and 2 and their consequence 3,
are what Stanley & Williamson derive from the Karttunen Account. It is
therefore possible to reject their argument simply by rejecting that theory.
However, Stanley & Williamson are correct when they point out that the
Karttunen Account is a standard theory in formal semantics. Of course, this
does not mean that everybody has to accept it, but it would be better to
have good reasons not to do so, reasons independent from the question of
knowledge-how.
One such independent reason to reject the Karttunen Account would be
a better rival theory from the literature within linguistics. One such rival
has been proposed by Manfred Krifka (2001), and Laura Michaelis (forth-
coming) explicity shows how an even further linguistic account bears on
the philosophical problem of knowledge-how. A further option is to deny
that knowledge-how can be understood in terms of knowledge-wh, or – with
Jonathan Schaffer (2007) – to deny that knowledge-wh can be understood in
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terms of knowledge-that. Finally, as opposed to rejecting the Karttunen Ac-
count in general, one might argue specifically against the first two premises of
the Argument from Linguistics, such as Daniele Sgaravatti and Elia Zardini
(2008), who object to premise 1, and Rowland Stout (2010) who objects to
premise 2.3
However viable and interesting these dialectical options are, I will not
discuss them here. My strategy will be to show that – independently of
the outcome of these debates at the intersection of linguistics and the phi-
losophy of language – the Argument from Linguistics fails. It fails because
it is not clear that linguistics can do philosophical work in the way Stan-
ley & Williamson assume. Their bridge from the analysis of language to
metaphysical claims is premise 4. As far as I can see, they do not even
explicitly formulate this claim, but they evidently rely on it (compare, for
example Stanley & Williamson 2001, 411 f.). I will provide two independet
arguments for the conclusion that this bridge is unstable. We should reject
premise 4 and with it the Argument from Linguistics.
Before getting started, let me make two remarks. First, by arguing that
this bridge from language to metaphysics is unstable, I do not reject every
such bridge. I agree that much of philosophy has to start with an analysis of
3Both of these enterprises rely heavily on the distinction between what does and what
does not qualify as an answer to a question in a strict sense. I cannot discuss this issue in
the present context, but on a standard view of the matter, both seem to fail. Sgaravatti &
Zardini claim that one can know an answer to the question “How to square the circle?” –
the only correct answer “In no way!” – without thereby knowing how to square the circle.
But they acknowledge that a question of the form “How can one F?” typically carries the
presupposition that there is a way to F. Thus, “In no way!” cannot count as an answer in
the strict sense. Compare: When asked “Have you stopped beating your wife?”, one can
deny the question’s presupposition, but only “Yes” and “No” count as answers in a strict
sense. By contrast, Stout argues that one might know of an answer to a question that it
is true without thereby knowing an answer to that question. He thinks that both “What
does 3 + 5 make?” and “What added to 5 makes 8?” can be answered by citing the fact
that 3 + 5 makes 8. However, the answers to these questions are “8” and “3”, respectively.
One can know these answers in virtue of the fact that 3 + 5 makes 8, and one can even
say “3 + 5 makes 8” in response to them. But that fact is not itself an answer. “8” and
“3” are the answers, even if this is conveyed in the statement “3 + 5 makes 8”. After all,
one can also know that “3” is the answer to “What added to 5 makes 8?” in virtue of a
different fact, the fact that 8 - 5 makes 3, and one can convey this answer by saying “8 -
5 makes 3”. In any case, it is not clear at all whether such a case can be constructed for
knowledge-how.
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the way we think and talk. Given that premise 4 turns out to be a problematic
connection between language and metaphysics, we should still look out for
better ones.
Second, it could be argued in defense of Stanley & Williamson that while
premise 4 might indeed be problematic, the instance needed for their argu-
ment might nevertheless be true. That is, we might simply replace 4 with:
4* If Linguistics determines that “S knows how to F” is true if and
only if, for some contextually relevant way w which is a way for S
to F, S knows that w is a way for them to F, then knowledge how
to F is, for some contextually relevant way w, knowledge that w
is a way to F.
But this defense begs the question. If 4 is implausible, the burden of proof
about particular instances of this scheme – such as 4* – is on those defending
them, not on those rejecting them. In other words, unless we learn what
should be special about knowledge-how and the expression “to know how to”,
we can reject the Argument from Linguistics by rejecting 4.
2.2 Language understated
I have promised two arguments against Stanley & Williamson’s bridge from
language to metaphysics. The first of these has already been developped
nicely by Ian Rumfitt (2003). He argues that if the Argument from Linguis-
tics is sound, so are corresponding arguments about languages other than
English. And if metaphysical claims can be inferred from claims about some
language, these claims should be consistent with what other languages sug-
gest. In short, if Stanley & Williamson urge us to take language seriously,
we cannot take only one language seriously. They understate language.
This shows that the Argument from Linguistics is specific to English. In
particular, the first step of the argument should be corrected. It turns out
that we do not arrive at 3, but at:
3* Linguistics determines that “S knows how to F” is true in English
if and only if, for some contextually relevant way w which is a
way for S to F, S knows that w is a way for them to F.
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But how can we now use 4 in order to derive 5?
4 If Linguistics determines that “S has the property P” is true if
and only if S has the property Q, then P is Q.
3* concerns the truth-conditions of English ascriptions of knowledge-how
whereas 4 concerns all ascriptions of knowledge-how. Accordingly, Rum-
fitt points out that this step of the argument will be undermined if we find
examples of ascriptions of knowledge-how which differ from those in En-
glish. In particular, the argument fails if we find a sentence “such that the
best semantic theory for the language to which it belongs will construe its
knowledge-verb as expressing (in that sentential context) a relation between
a person and an activity.” (Rumfitt 2003, 160) Without looking out for such
sentences, it would be premature to infer a metaphysical thesis – such as
Intellectualism – from linguistic data. And “the quest for such examples can-
not be confined to English sentences. This is because the metaphysical thesis
concerns the nature of knowledge-how, not the semantics of ‘knows how’.”
(Rumfitt 2003, 160) In short, it is possible to derive 5 from 3* and 4 only if
the linguistic evidence across languages is univocal.
Given the vast number and diversity of languages, it should not be sur-
prising that there is evidence to the contrary. This is even aggravated by the
fact that French, a language very closely related to English, provides such
counterexamples. Consider sentences involving the expression ‘savoir faire’,
for example “Il sait nager.” Again bracketing the exact linguistic subtleties,
there is a crucial difference between this sentence and English sentences in-
volving ‘to know how’: “Il sait nager” is not analyzed in terms of embedded
questions. Therefore, it is impossible to apply the Karttunen Account and
infer that this sentence attributes knowledge-that (compare Rumfitt 2003,
160 ff.).
A natural defense on behalf of Stanley & Williamson is to claim that the
‘linguistic deep structure’ even of prima facie counterexamples like this still
turns out to conform to the analysis they have given for English. Ascriptions
of knowledge-how in other languages might also involve embedded questions –
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even if there is no interrogative particle involved at all.4 But this seems to beg
the question. Why should we accept such a globalization of the Karttunen
Account? Stanley & Williamson could try to justify this conjecture with a
further conjecture, the idea that “the uses of ‘know’ in [‘Hannah knows how
to ride a bicycle’] and [‘Hannah knows that penguins waddle’] are translated
by the same word” in all natural languages (Stanley & Williamson 2001,
237). However plausible such a line of argument from lexical uniformity to
syntactic deep structure may be, we can yet again make the unsurprising
discovery that some languages use different words in order to translate these
two uses of ‘to know’. In most cases, German fits this bill,5 but in any case,
Rumfitt shows that Russian is an absolutely clear case in point (compare
2003, 164). Thus, this line of defense is blocked by the linguistic data.
I conclude that Rumfitt is right: Taking language seriously requires taking
languages seriously. And then, the Argument from Linguistics fails because
premise 4 turns out to be false. It cannot be true that if Linguistics deter-
mines that “S has the property P” is true if and only if S has the property
Q, then P actually is Q. Instances of “S has the property P” in different
languages have different truth-conditions. And it would be absurd to hold
that all of these are necessarily instantiated whenever any instance of “S has
the property P” is true, regardless of the language it is formulated in.
2.3 Language overstated
The above argument relies on the idea that Stanley & Williamson do not
take language seriously enough. However, there is a complementary reac-
tion to their argument: Why should linguistics bear on metaphysics in the
first place? Alva Noë has suggested that the Argument from Linguistics
is an instance of “good old-fashioned Oxford philosophy (GOOP)”, which is
“methodologically backward” (Noë 2005, 279, 290). According to him, there
4Jason Stanley (2011) claims that this is the case.
5In German, there are three verbs corresponding to the three uses of ‘to know’ philoso-
phers have found most important. Knowledge by acquaintance – as in “I know her” –
is expressed by ‘kennen’, knowledge-that is expressed by ‘wissen’ and knowledge-how is
expressed by ‘können’. However, instead of ‘können’, one sometimes also uses ‘wissen wie’,
which is similar to ‘to know how’.
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is no reason to infer facts about knowledge from facts about ‘to know’. Stan-
ley & Williamson simply overstate language.
So far, this worry is far too general. But it relies on more than an in-
tuitive unease with a certain style of philosophy. While Noë goes on to
criticize mainly how Stanley & Williamson treat knowledge-how and abili-
ties (compare section 3), I think that there is an independent argument for
the conclusion that the Argument from Linguistics overstates language.
I have already indicated that the Karttunen Account is praised, among
other things, because it offers a unified explanation of the expression ‘to
know’ followed by various interrogative particles including ‘how’. But in
philosophical discussions, there is one such construction which has received
considerable interest, namely: “Tom knows what it is like to be a bat.” Cru-
cially, the Karttunen Account treats ‘knows what it is like to’ along the very
same lines.6 It implies that Tom knows what it is like to be a bat just in case
he knows that something is the case. In line with Stanley & Williamson’s
analysis of knowledge-how, the most natural candidate is this: Tom knows
what it is like to be a bat just in case he knows, for some quality of experience
q, that q is what it is like to be a bat.
I think that these considerations provide a further reason to reject Stanley
& Williamson’s bridge from linguistics to metaphysics:
4 If Linguistics determines that “S has the property P” is true if
and only if S has the property Q, then P is Q.
If the Karttunen Account is true, this claim seems to be false. For even if
ascriptions of knowledge-what-it-is-like are true just in case some knowledge-
that about qualia can also truly be ascribed, it does not follow that knowledge-
what-it-is-like therefore is knowledge-that about qualia. Rather than knowl-
edge about qualia, knowledge-what-it-is-like essentially involves phenomenal
acquaintance with something, say, being a bat. Even if this were coinstanti-
ated with knowledge-that, how could it actually be a species of knowledge-
that?
6I will not go into detail here, but linguists have confirmed that this is correct.
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It should be noted that some philosophers explain the difference between
knowledge-what-it-is-like and knowledge-that by claiming that knowledge-
what-it-is-like is a form of knowledge-how – very roughly, knowledge how to
imagine the experience in question.7 Of course, this view presupposes the
falsity of Intellectualism since knowledge-what-it-is-like, understood in terms
of knowledge-how, only differs from knowledge-that if knowledge-how differs
from knowledge-that. Thus, in criticizing the Argument from Linguistics on
the basis of a notion of knowledge-what-it-is-like that differs from knowledge-
that, I have to reject this view on pain of committing a petitio principii. As
already indicated, I think that knowledge-what-it-is-like is best understood
in terms of the notion of acquaintance and I see no need to understand
acquaintance in terms of knowledge-how. But I cannot discuss this issue
here in more detail.
My argument about knowledge-what-it-is-like is a reductio of the con-
junction of premise 4 and the Karttunen Account. Thus, it could also be
used in order to attack the latter rather than the former. But I will not take
sides on the Karttunen Account in this paper. My argument only targets
Stanley & Williamson’s bridge from language to metaphysics and remains
neutral on the linguistic question. One reason why I think that this is a
better way to take the present argument is that there are parallel problems
at the intersection of formal semantics and the philosophy of language. In
particular, I think that modality is a phenomenon that should lead us to
the same conclusion. Even if the best linguistic account of some expressions
analyzes them in terms of possible worlds, it does not follow that possible
worlds are more fundamental than modalities and that modalities actually
are constellations of possible worlds. Given linguistic theory, there is still
room for debate about metaphysics.
Let me briefly point out a further complication for Stanley & Williamson.
7The so-called Knowledge Argument against physicalism – formulated most promi-
nently by Nagel (1974) and Jackson (1982, 1986) – has been criticized on these grounds
by Levin (1986), Nemirow (1990) and Mellor (1993). This dialectic has partly motivated a
renewed interest in knowledge-how and Intellectualism; compare, for example, Stanley &
Williamson (2001, 442 ff.) and Snowdon (2003, 26 ff.). Compare Alter (2001) and Nida-
Rümelin (2009) for further discussion, especially on the question if the response relies
essentially on the notion of know-how rather than the notion of ability.
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The kind of knowledge-that they take to be identical with knowledge-how
involves ways of doing things. But what are these? Stanley & Williamson
write:
We believe that any successful account of natural language must
postulate entities such as ways. But we shall not have much more
of substance to say about the metaphysics of ways in this paper.
(2001, 427)
By analogy, it seems like they are committed to the claim that any successful
account of natural language must postulate entities such as qualia. For just
like ways of doing things are part of the kind of knowledge-that to which
knowledge-how is reduced, qualia are part of the kind of knowledge-that to
which knowledge-what-it-is-like is reduced.8 Again, we are presented with
the claim that a metaphysical question – “Are there qualia at all?” – is
decided by linguistic theory. Of course, one might try to avoid this problem
by looking for a different analysis of knowledge-what-it-is-like as knowledge-
that which does not involve qualia. But even if such an analysis is possible,
it merely solves this further complication. It still remains incredible that
knowledge-what-it-is-like actually is knowledge-that.9
I conclude that Stanley & Williamson’s bridge from linguistics to meta-
physics does not hold. We have good reason to reject premise 4 and thereby
the Argument from Linguistics.
3 Intellectualism and ability
Having cast some doubt on Stanley & Williamson’s Argument from Lin-
guistics, let me now go on to cast doubt on its conclusion. In particular, I
will discuss what Stanley & Williamson say about the relationship between
8Of course, even if qualia exist, the logical space for accounting for them will remain
large. For example, they may be ontologically grounded in other entities such as brain-
states.
9In conversation, Jason Stanley has expressed his readiness to bite these bulletts. While
this issue leads to a more thorough discussion of phenomenal knowledge, my reaction is:
So much the worse for Linguistic Intellectualism.
12
knowledge-how and practical ability (section 3.1) and show that this view is
unfounded (section 3.2).
3.1 From abilities to practical modes of presentation
If knowledge-how is merely knowledge that such-and-such is a way to do
something, where does the ability to actually do so come in? Stanley &
Williamson answer: “Nowhere, and why should it?”
It is simply false, however, that ascriptions of knowledge-how
ascribe abilities. [...] [A]scriptions of knowledge-how do not even
entail ascriptions of the corresponding abilities. For example,
a ski instructor may know how to perform a certain complex
stunt without being able to perform it herself. Similarly, a master
pianist who loses both her arms in a tragic car accident still knows
how to play the piano. But she has lost her ability to do so.
(Stanley & Williamson 2001, 416)
Does this mean that it is simply a mistake to think that there is a conceptual
connection between my knowledge-how and my actions? Let us assume for a
moment that knowledge-how has indeed little to do with ability. Still, Stanley
& Williamson see for themselves that there are prima facie counterexamples
to their theory:
Suppose that the way in which John is riding his bicycle is in fact
a way for Hannah to ride a bicycle. So, where the demonstrative
‘that way’ denotes John’s way of riding a bicycle, (28) seems true:
(28) Hannah knows that that way is a way for her to ride a bicycle.
Relative to this context, however:
(29) Hannahi knows [how PROi to ride a bicycle].
seems false. (Stanley & Williamson 2001, 429 f.)
What Hannah lacks is a connection between her knowledge and her actions
rather than John’s. Stanley & Williamson agree. However, they think that
what is missing is not Hannah’s ability to ride a bicycle, but something
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concerning her knowledge-that about John’s way of riding a bicycle. In order
to account for this missing element, they amend their linguistic account of
the truth-conditions of “S knows how to F” with some philosophy of language
and claim the following:
“S knows how to F” is true if and only if, for some contextually
relevant way w which is a way for S to F, S knows that w is a
way for them to F, and S entertains w under a practical mode of
presentation. (compare Stanley & Williamson 2001, 430 f.)10
Accordingly, what Hannah lacks is a practical mode of presentation of John’s
way of riding a bicycle. She entertains this way in a purely demonstrative
mode of presentation and therefore lacks knowledge-how.
But what are practical modes of presentation of ways of doing things?
Stanley & Williamson rely substantively on this concept, and unless they
spell out in more detail what such modes of presentation might be, their at-
tempt of accomodating the intuitive connection between knowledge-how and
action is incomplete. Even worse, entertaining some way w under a practi-
cal mode of presentation might come down to knowing how to instantiate it
– Stanley & Williamson’s account would then be circular (compare Koethe
2002). Alternatively, entertaining some way w under a practical mode of
presentation might be having the ability to instantiate that way, contrary
to their explicit denial of a connection between knowledge-how and ability
(compare Rosefeldt 2004 and Jung & Newen 2010).
However, Stanley & Williamson try to avoid these consequences by leav-
ing the exact nature of practical modes of presentation for another occasion.
What matters, they claim, is that there are such things, never mind what
exactly they are. They argue by analogy:
Suppose that John is looking in a mirror, which he mistakenly
believes to be a window. Seeing a man whose pants are on fire,
10I will omit the question whether modes of presentation are part of pragmatics rather
than semantics. Stanley & Williamson are right: Their account can accomodate this, too.
Further, let me note that the addition of modes of presentation changes the content of
parts of the Argument from Linguistics, but that this does not bear on the discussion
above.
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and not recognizing that man as himself, John forms the demon-
strative belief that that man is on fire. [...] [R]elative to this
envisaged context, (26) is true and (27) false:
(26) John believes that that man has burning pants.
(27) John believes that he himself has burning pants. (2001, 428)
It is typically assumed that (26) and (27) both picture John as believing in
the truth of one and the same proposition, that he believes, of himself, that
he has burning pants. In (26), John believes, of the person he happens to
be, that that person has burning pants. In (27), John believes, of himself as
himself, that he has burning pants. Canonically, this is explained by appeal
to the mode of presentation under which John entertains that belief about
himself: The first case involves a demonstrative mode of presentation and
the second case a first-personal mode of presentation.
Now, Stanley & Williamson grant that it may be very difficult to char-
acterize exactly both what first-personal and what practical modes of pre-
sentation are. But they compare (26) and (27) with their examples (28) and
(29) which are quoted on page 13:
In both cases, however, one can provide an existence proof for
such modes of presentation. If, as is assumed in much of philoso-
phy of language, there is a sound argument from (26) and (27) to
the existence of first-personal guises of propositions, then there is
a sound argument from (28) and (29) to the existence of practical
guises of propositions. (Stanley & Williamson 2001, 429)
Alva Noë has criticized this analogy as “plainly circular” because we have
“no independent reason to believe that the complement clauses in (28) and
(29) express the same proposition.” (2005, 288) But this is mistaken since
the first part of the Argument from Linguistics provides such an independent
reason. One may disagree with this argument, but Stanley & Williamson do
not commit a dialectical mistake.
This concludes Stanley & Williamson’s attempt of accomodating the in-
tuitive connection between knowledge-how and action. They argue that there
are such things as practical modes of presentation of ways of doing things and
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claim that these are independent from being able to engage in those ways
of doing things. How such modes of presentation should be understood,
however, remains an open question.
3.2 Abilities reestablished
It has turned out that Stanley & Williamson’s commitment to practical
modes of presentation of ways of doing things is not without its problems.
However, it is a consequence of two ideas they explicitly endorse, the Argu-
ment from Linguistics on the one hand, and the claim that knowledge-how
is independent from ability on the other. Given this background, assuming
such modes of presentation is a bullet they simply have to bite. Accordingly,
there are two independently sufficient ways to avoid such a commitment.
Above, I have already criticized the Argument from Linguistics. Now, I will
cast serious doubt on their view of the relationship between knowledge-how
and ability.
Like Stanley & Williamson, Paul Snowdon (2003) also thinks that knowl-
edge how to F is independent from the ability to F. In order to support this
claim, these authors rely on examples like the following:11
Skiing A ski instructor knows how to perform a complex stunt. Still, he is
not able to do so himself.
Piano A piano player loses her arms. She still knows how to play the piano,
but has lost her ability to do so.
Pudding A cook knows how to make Christmas pudding. If the world’s
supply of sugar is obliterated, he still knows how to do so, but has lost
his ability to do so.
Etiquette Susan knows how to address the queen correctly, but is unable to
do so because she gets too nervous in the queen’s presence and develops
11Skiing and Piano are taken from Stanley & Williamson 2001 (416), the others from
Snowdon 2003 (8 f.). Snowdon also cites three further cases, but I think that these can
be accounted for along the lines of the cases I discuss. Namely, Snowdon’s cases “(b)” and
“(d)” parallel Piano and his case “(e)” parallels Etiquette.
16
a speech impediment.
I agree that these cases show that there is some sense in which one may
have knowledge how to do something without having the ability to do so.
However, they eventually fail to support the claim that knowledge-how is
independent from ability. In order to bring out this point, I will have to offer
better redescriptions of these alleged counterexamples.12
I take it that three of the four cases can be redescribed following a sim-
ple strategy: The person in question does not only have knowledge how to
do something, but also has the ability to do so, which, for some reason or
another, is blocked from being executed (compare Noë 2005).
Piano The piano player still has the ability to play the piano, but without
her arms she cannot execute it. Her ability is blocked by a bodily
impediment.
Pudding The cook still has the ability to prepare Christmas pudding, but
without sugar he cannot execute it. His ability is blocked by an external
impediment.
Etiquette Susan has the ability to address the queen correctly, but because
of her nervous condition she cannot execute it. Her ability is blocked
by a psychological, possibly a neurological impediment.
These redescriptions are perfectly intelligible because the notion of an ability
is tied to the notion of possible successful action, given some preconditions.
If these preconditions are absent, and the action in question therefore cannot
be performed, there is no need to infer that there is no ability in the first
place.13 But what if the impediments in question are so severe that the
abilities are not only temporarily, but forever blocked from being executed?
12One might criticize this by claiming that my redescriptions are biased. Bengson et al.
2009 have tried to support the rival claim that knowledge-how and ability are independent
by engaging in a statistical study of people’s intuitive verdicts about these and cognate
cases. Bracketing how plausible experimental philosophy is in general, this study in par-
ticular is flawed in several respects, as shown by Jung & Newen 2010.
13Compare Hawley (2003). Of course, abilities cannot be understood in such a way
that too many impediments are compatible with their existence. For example, it would be
false to say that I have the ability to beat every chess grand master, which happens to be
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For example, having lost her arms, the piano player will never be able to play
again. If so, how can we continue to believe that she has the ability to do
so?
This is a fair question, but it is not the only one. It has a sibling, namely:
How can we continue to believe that she knows how to do so? What the
alleged counterexamples would have to show is that these questions have
to be answered independently. But they fail to establish this. Rather, it
is possible – and, I would say, very plausible – to claim that the question
whether or not the ability to play the piano can be retained even if both
arms are lost has to be answered in tandem with the question whether or
not knowledge how to do so can be retained under these conditions. Either
both are retained or none.14Thus, the most natural position is that both the
knowledge-how and the ability to play the piano are lost. However, both
may be able to persist in the way part of that person’s brain works and what
information is stored there. When these features of her brain are gradually
lost, so are both the ability and the knowledge-how in question (compare
Jung & Newen 2010, 117).
This leaves one last case in support of the view that knowledge-how and
ability are independent:
Skiing A ski instructor knows how to perform a complex stunt. Still, he is
not able to do so himself.
I am not alone in thinking that this case is misdescribed even more profoundly
(compare Noë 2005). The idea that this ski instructor knows how to perform
a stunt simply relies on the fact that he is able to teach others how to
perform that stunt. But the knowledge-how that implies is not knowledge
blocked because of the limits of my intelligence. I simply do not have that ability. There
is a threshold for what may count as a blocked ability and what cannot sensibly be called
an ability at all.
14Let me note two things at this point. First, this account is also available to Stanley &
Williamson. The acquaintance with a way of doing something under a practical mode of
presentation may very well fade if it is not used in action. Thus, even if knowledge-how is
understood along the lines of Linguistic Intellectualism, it might still be linked to ability.
Second, this connection between knowledge-how and ability leaves entirely open whether
or not some knowledge-that related to the capacities in question might survive their loss.
I will come back to this in section 5.2.
18
how to perform the stunt, but knowledge how to teach others how to perform
the stunt. It is a commonplace truth that knowledge how to teach how to do
something does not imply knowledge how to do it. Some teachers know how
to do what they teach, others do not. Maybe there are activities one can only
know how to teach if one knows how to perform them oneself. Performing
a ski jump is not one of those, but maybe philosophizing and conducting an
orchestra are. But this still does not show that knowing how to perform and
knowing how to teach how to perform are the same thing.
I conclude that the alleged independence of knowledge-how from abil-
ity has not been established by any of the examples cited by Stanley &
Williamson and Snowdon. Even though I have not positively shown why
knowledge-how and ability are connected,15 there is no reason to detach
them.16 I will come back to this connection in section 5.
4 Ryle’s objection
I have argued that Stanley & Williamson fail to establish Intellectualism
(section 2) and that they fail to establish the claim that knowledge-how is
independent from practical abilities (section 3). In this section, I will turn
to Gilbert Ryle’s influential stance on knowledge-how. He writes:
Philosophers have not done justice to the distinction which is
quite familiar to all of us between knowing that something is the
15Those who support this view include Carr (1979, 1981) and Katzoff (1984). Often, they
rely on possible successful action as a crucial connection between ability and knowledge-
how. Above, I have subscribed to possible success as an ingredient of the notion of ability,
but I will not continue to explore these questions in my own discussion of knowledge-how.
Katherine Hawley (2003) has proposed an interesting analysis of this issue.
16The claim that knowledge-how is a form of ability implies that animals pose a fur-
ther threat to Linguistic Intellectualism. For if some abilities of animals can be classi-
fied as knowledge-how, this theory implies that they possess knowledge-that. But given
knowledge-how in animals, it should remain an open question whether or not they have
propositional knowledge, too. Stanley & Williamson think that we ascribe knowledge-that
to animals as happily as knowledge-how (2001, 438 f.). But I take it that most of us would
credit, say, some dogs with knowledge how to catch a frisbee, but have trouble conceiving
of those dogs as knowing that such-and-such is a way for them to catch a frisbee (compare
Rosefeldt 2004, Noë 2005 and Jung & Newen 2010). However, I will bracket animal cases
in this context.
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case and knowing how to do things. In their theories of knowledge
they concentrate on the discovery of truths or facts, and they
either ignore the discovery of ways and methods of doing things
or else they try to reduce it to the discovery of facts. [...] I
want to turn the tables and prove that knowledge-how cannot be
defined in terms of knowledge-that and further, that the concept
of knowledge-how is a concept logically prior to the concept of
knowledge-that. (Ryle 1945, 4 f.)
I will argue that Stanley & Williamson’s reconstruction of Ryle’s argument
misses a crucial point. I distinguish between different versions of Ryle’s argu-
ment and show how what I take to be the strongest version is both immune to
the objection by Stanley & Williamson and a decisive argument against their
own version of Intellectualism. Thus, next to my above arguments against the
motivation of Linguistic Intellectualism, Ryle’s objection provides a clear-cut
argument showing directly that this view is mistaken.
4.1 Stanley & Williamson’s Ryle
Gilbert Ryle writes:
The crucial objection to the intellectualist legend is this. The
consideration of propositions is itself an operation the execution of
which can be more or less intelligent, less or more stupid. But if,
for any operation to be intelligently executed, a prior theoretical
operation had first to be performed and performed intelligently,
it would be a logical impossibility for anyone ever to break into
the circle. (Ryle 1949, 31)
Here is how Stanley & Williamson construe this reasoning:
Ryle’s argument has two premises:
(1) If one Fs, one employs knowledge how to F.
(2) If one employs knowledge that p, one contemplates the propo-
sition that p. (2001, 413)
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If knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that, the content of
knowledge how to F is, for some φ, the proposition that φ(F ).
So, the assumption for reductio is:
RA: knowledge how to F is knowledge that φ(F ). (2001, 414)
The idea is that, given (1) and (2), RA implies that “doing anything would
require contemplating an infinite number of propositions of ever-increasing
complexity.” (Stanley & Williamson 2001, 414) But since nobody should
be credited with the ability to do that and many people in fact do employ
knowledge-how, RA is rejected. However, Stanley & Williamson think that
Ryle’s argument does not get off the ground. There is no uniform
reading of the two premises in Ryle’s argument on which both are
true; the argument is unsound. (2001, 416)
The problem is that premise (1) has to be restricted to intentional actions,
while contemplating propositions, as mentioned in premise (2), is not an in-
tentional action. As for premise (1), there are many things we do without
knowing how to do them. Stanley & Williamson present convincing exam-
ples: digesting food or winning a fair lottery (2001, 414 f.). Thus, if Ryle’s
argument is to be valid, premise (2) will also have to be read as concerning
an intentional action of contemplating.
Let me make this correction explicit and add two premises which have
already been mentioned (2 and 5 below). Given these changes, this is a full
statement of how Stanley & Williamson understand Ryle:
1 If one intentionally Fs, one employs knowledge how to F.
2 Knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that if and only if knowl-
edge how to F is, for some φ, knowledge that φ(F ).
3 If one employs knowledge that p, one intentionally contemplates
the proposition that p.
4 Thus, if knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that, to inten-
tionally F requires contemplating an infinite number of proposi-
tions of ever-increasing complexity.
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5 To intentionally F does not require that.
6 Thus, knowledge-how is not a species of knowledge-that.
Let me call this argument the Contemplation Regress. This reconstruction
makes clear how the vicious regress arises. By 1, intentional action requires
knowledge-how. Assuming the doctrine that knowledge-how is a species of
knowledge-that, 2 requires that such knowledge-how is propositional. By 3,
employing such knowledge requires contemplating a proposition. Since this is
an intentional action, by 1, it requires a further bit of knowledge-how. This,
by 2, consists in a further bit of knowledge-that, the employment of which, by
3, requires contemplating a further, more complex proposition, and so on ad
infinitum. Thus, premises 1-3 imply 4, which allows for the use of 5 in order
to reject the doctrine that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that.
Where do Stanley & Williamson disagree with Ryle? They point out that
the argument depends on premise 3, what I would like to call the Contem-
plation Requirement, and assert that this is “straightforwardly false” (2001,
415). If contemplating a proposition is an intentional action, “it is simply
false that manifestations of knowledge-that must be accompanied by dis-
tinct actions of contemplating propositions” (2001, 415). If we say that the
contemplation of a known proposition is in some sense required in order to
employ knowledge-that, this contemplation should not be regarded as an
intentional action.
Stanley & Williamson (2001, 415) support this view with a counterexam-
ple due to Carl Ginet:
I exercise (or manifest) my knowledge that one can get the door
open by turning the knob and pushing it (as well as my knowledge
that there is a door there) by performing that operation quite
automatically as I leave the room; and I may do this, of course,
without formulating (in my mind or out loud) that proposition
or any other relevant proposition (Ginet 1975, 7).
This is indeed suited at least to call the Contemplation Requirement into
question. For my present purposes, I will therefore grant that the Contem-
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plation Regress should be rejected.17
However, Stanley & Williamson miss a crucial part of Ryle’s argument.
Intellectualism, he writes, is committed to the view that to employ knowledge-
that is
always to do two things; namely, to consider certain appropri-
ate propositions, or prescriptions, and to put into practice what
these propositions or prescriptions enjoin. It is to do a bit of the-
ory and then to do a bit of practice. [...] I shall argue that the
intellectualist legend is false and that when we describe a perfor-
mance as intelligent, this does not entail the double operation of
considering and executing. (Ryle 1949, 30)
Of this ‘double operation’ of considering and executing, Stanley &Williamson
have addressed only half. They have argued that considering propositions,
understood as an intentional action, cannot be required for employing knowledge-
that. However, they have left the “putting into practice” of these propositions
out of the picture. This is puzzling, since they themselves quote Ryle as fol-
lows (compare Stanley & Williamson 2001, 412):
I largely rely on variations of one argument. I argue that the
prevailing doctrine leads to vicious regresses, and these in two di-
rections. (1) If the intelligence exhibited in any act, practical or
theoretical, is to be credited to the occurrence of some ulterior act
of intelligently considering regulative propositions, no intelligent
act, practical or otherwise, could ever begin [...]. (2) If a deed,
to be intelligent, has to be guided by the consideration of a reg-
ulative proposition, the gap between that consideration and the
practical application of the regulation has to be bridged by some
go-between process which cannot by the pre-supposed definition
itself be an exercise of intelligence and cannot, by definition, be
the resultant deed. (Ryle 1945, 2)
17It should nevertheless be noted that this counterexample conflates the contemplation
of propositions with their conscious contemplation.
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Thus, Ryle can give away the argument sketched after “(1)” in this passage –
the Contemplation Regress – and fall back on a second regress argument sup-
porting the same conclusion: the one sketched after “(2)”.18 This argument
can be presented as follows:
1* If one intentionally Fs, one employs knowledge how to F.
2* Knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that if and only if knowl-
edge how to F is, for some φ, knowledge that φ(F ).
3* If one employs knowledge that p, one intentionally applies the
proposition that p to the case at hand.
4* Thus, if knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that, to inten-
tionally F requires applying an infinite number of propositions
of ever-increasing complexity to an infinite number of cases of
ever-increasing complexity.
5* To intentionally F does not require that.
6* Thus, knowledge-how is not a species of knowledge-that.
I will call this argument the Application Regress. Obviously, it closely par-
allels the Contemplation Regress. Among other things, 1*, 2* and 6* are
identical with 1, 2 and 6, respectively. Also, the inference from 1*-3* to 4*
can be understood along the same lines as the corresponding inference in the
first regress argument.
However, as my labels already indicate, the nature of the regress has
changed (4* and 5*). While the Contemplation Regress rejects Intellectu-
alism on the grounds that it requires contemplating an infinite number of
18Why have Stanley & Williamson overlooked this? In the part both they and I have
omitted from the above quotation, Ryle mentions that the first regress “is the turn of
the argument that I chiefly use” (1945, 2). Also, they quote only this passage from
Ryle’s Presidential Address on Knowing How and Knowing That (1945) and otherwise rely
exclusively on Ryle’s later discussion of knowledge-how in The Concept of Mind (1949),
where the second argument plays a very minor role.
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propositions, the Application Regress does so on the grounds that it requires
applying these propositions to an infinite number of cases. Ryle himself ex-
plicitly states this problem. Speaking of the “go-between application-process”
as construed by Intellectualists, he says:
Consistency requires, therefore, that this schizophrenic broker
must again be subdivided into one bit which contemplates but
does not execute, one which executes but does not contemplate
and a third which reconciles these irreconcilables. And so on for
ever. (Ryle 1945, 3)
[I]t requires intelligence not only to discover truths, but also to
apply them, and knowing how to apply truths cannot, without
setting up an infinite process, be reduced to knowledge of some
extra bridge-truths. (Ryle 1945, 6)
Obviously, this difference relies on a different premise as the trigger of the
regress, namely 3*, which I would like to call the Application Requirement.
Let me evaluate the plausibility of this requirement with the aid of Stanley
& Williamson’s own example (2001, 415, and Ginet 1975, 7).
I have granted that my knowledge that one can get the door open by
turning the knob and pushing it does not have to be contemplated in order
for me to be able to leave the room. However, there is clearly some sense
in which I need to apply this knowledge in order do so. Given that I know
that one can get the door open by turning the knob and pushing it, I must
judge what specific action I need to perform in order to do so. This will
turn on my knowledge of the location of the door and how I can reach it.
But, again, without applying this knowledge, it is not clear how it helps me
actually leave the room.
John Koethe has suggested that an objection along these lines is “similar
in spirit to Ryle’s” (2002, 328) and claimed that it eventually defeats Intel-
lectualism. I agree that Ryle can be read as making this argument. However,
Stanley & Williamson are free to object against the Application Regress in
the very same way as they have objected against the Contemplation Regress.
They can simply deny that the application of propositions to cases is an in-
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tentional action: Even though employing knowledge-that does mean applying
this knowledge to a case, such an application is not an intentional action.
Just like one can walk intentionally without intentionally engaging in several
sub-actions of muscle contraction, one can employ knowledge-that without
intentionally engaging in the sub-action of applying it. Thus, both the Con-
templation Regress and the Application Regress eventually fail.
4.2 Correctness
I have discussed how Stanley & Williamson understand Ryle and how they
can answer both the Contemplation Regress, which they explicitly discuss,
and the Application Regress, which they fail to address. In both cases, the
problem is that if employing knowledge-that requires some further action, it
is plausible to deny that it has to be an intentional action.
However, I think we should shift the issue from a problem about inten-
tional action to a problem about correct action. This is both closer to Ryle’s
original ideas and more plausible independently.19 And it leads to a third
and final regress argument against Intellectualism.
This third argument can be understood as an adaptation of the Applica-
tion Regress. Its core insight is that we should look not at acting intentionally
and intentional application of knowledge-that, but at acting correctly and
correct application of knowledge-that. Accordingly, I will call this argument
the Correctness Regress. Here is how it works in detail:
1’ If one correctly Fs, one employs knowledge how to F.
2’ Knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that if and only if knowl-
edge how to F is, for some φ, knowledge that φ(F ).
3’ If one employs knowledge that p, one correctly applies the propo-
sition that p to the case at hand.
19Charles Wallis (2008) discusses extensively why conscious intent does not play an
important role for knowledge-how, whether Intellectualism is true or not.
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4’ Thus, if knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that, to cor-
rectly F requires correctly applying an infinite number of propo-
sitions of ever-increasing complexity to an infinite number of cases
of ever-increasing complexity.
5’ To correctly F does not require that.
6’ Thus, knowledge-how is not a species of knowledge-that.
I do not think that Gilbert Ryle does a very good job at distinguishing
the Application Regress from the Correctness Regress.20 Much of what he
says naturally leads to the idea that knowledge is supposed to be applied
intentionally and thereby to the Application Regress. All things considered,
however, I hold that the Correctness Regress fits in more smoothly with
Ryle’s overall thinking about knowledge and action, and that it brings out
the full force of his objection to Intellectualism.
The core fact which leads me to this conclusion is that Ryle hardly ever
speaks of “intentional” action. Rather, he repeatedly states that he is in-
terested in “operations [that are] intelligently executed” (1949, 31). Such
‘exercises of intelligence’ are picked out in terms of the attributes we can
attach to them. They are actions which can be called ‘witty’, ‘stupid’, ‘in-
telligent’, ‘smart’, ‘dull’, ‘attentive’ and so forth (compare Ryle 1945, 1 f.,
and Ryle 1949, 26). In other words, they can be evaluated according to their
rationality, simplicity, originality and the like – that is, in the light of stan-
dards of intelligent conduct. And according to these standards, actions can
be better or worse, correct or incorrect.
These passages show that it is well justified to ascribe premise 1’ to Ryle.
Also, premise 3’ is well supported by Ryle’s texts. He explicitly writes that
“whatever “applying” may be, it is a proper exercise of intelligence” (1945,
3) and that somebody who has learned maxims of playing chess well “might
still play chess stupidly, that is, be unable intelligently to apply the maxims”
20And neither do many of his commentators. For example, the presentations of Ryle’s
argument by Jennifer Hornsby (2005, 113 ff.) and David Wiggins (2005, 268 f. and 273)
can be read in either way.
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(1945, 5). Thus, the Correctness Regress expresses best what Ryle was up to
all things considered: In order to apply knowledge-that, never mind whether
or not this is an intentional action, one has to apply it correctly. And to do
something correctly requires knowledge how to do so.
Let me remark that I do not want to claim that whether somebody acts
correctly is independent from the question whether she acts intentionally.
But I do claim that Ryle’s argument can be formulated without bothering
too much about this question. What is at issue is not – as in the first
two regress arguments – the agent’s inner life, her intentions and how she
acts upon them. Rather, we are concerned with the explanation of doing
something well or correctly, which transcends this inner life and includes
essentially intersubjective standards.21
I think that this is an argument Stanley & Williamson cannot resist.
After all, they are themselves committed to the claim that intersubjective
standards play a role in ascriptions of knowledge-how. They write:
Consider now:
(19) Hannah knows how PRO to ride a bicycle.
In such an example, we should expect the embedded question to
have four interpretive possibilities, corresponding to (20a-d):
(20a) Hannah knows how she ought to ride a bicycle.
(20b) Hannah knows how one ought to ride a bicycle.
(20c) Hannah knows how she could ride a bicycle.
(20d) Hannah knows how one could ride a bicycle. (Stanley &
Williamson 2001, 424 f.)
(20a) and (20b) show that knowledge-how concerns doing something how
it ought to be done – correctly. And (20b) and (20d) show that this is
21A further remark: Ryle would probably add a second Correctness Regress, which relies
on the claim that to apply knowledge-that requires correctly contemplating a proposition
before correctly applying it (compare the passage quoted on page 20, as well as Ryle 1945,
2 ff.). But I do not see exactly how a proposition can be contemplated in an incorrect
way, if this does not mean that it is not contemplated at all because what is actually
contemplated is a different proposition. However, this complication is independent from
the Correctness Regress as I have stated it.
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something which is not specific to a single person – it is intersubjective.
However, Stanley & Williamson go on:
The interpretations given in (20a) and (20b) quite obviously seem
to attribute some kind of propositional knowledge to Hannah,
so they are not the interpretations underlying the thesis that
knowledge-how is not a species of knowledge-that. (Stanley &
Williamson 2001, 425)
Of course, these interpretations do not immediately show why Intellectualism
is false. But they do play a role in showing that. By granting a role for inter-
subjective standards of correctness in knowledge-how, Stanley & Williamson
have effectively granted premise 1’ of the Correctness Regress. They think
that “[i]t is rather interpretations such as (20c) and (20d) that seem to be
at issue in philosophical discussions of knowledge-how” and that “(20c) [is]
the paradigm reading of (19), on which we shall focus in the rest of this dis-
cussion”. (Stanley & Williamson 2001, 425) But this is a mistake. Once we
have seen that the different readings of ascriptions of knowledge-how support
premise 1’, the Correctness Regress is on its way.
This argument shows that Linguistic Intellectualism is false qua Intellec-
tualism. Still, let me take the time and spell out the argument as applied to
Stanley & Williamson’s account.
Suppose that Hannah is riding her bicycle, which is something she does
properly, or correctly, and that she thereby knows how to ride a bicycle. If
Linguistic Intellectualism is true, her knowledge how to ride a bicycle boils
down to her knowledge that, say, sitting in the saddle and pedaling is a way
for her to ride a bicycle. Given that she correctly employs this knowledge
in riding a bicycle, she knows how to employ her knowledge that sitting in
the saddle and pedaling is a way for her to ride a bicycle. Given Linguistic
Intellectualism, this knowledge-how again boils down to her knowledge that,
say, placing herself on the saddle and letting her muscle memory do the rest
is a way for her to correctly employ her knowledge that sitting in the saddle
and pedaling is a way for her to ride a bicycle. But again, this knowledge
needs to be applied.
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Generally speaking, Linguistic Intellectualism leads to the result that to
do something correctly (to F correctly) requires knowledge that w is a way to
F, which requires knowledge that w’ is a way to correctly employ knowledge
that w is a way to F, which in turn requires knowledge that w* is a way to
correctly employ knowledge that w’ is a way to correctly employ knowledge
that w is a way to F, and so on ad infinitum.
It is natural to wonder whether Stanley & Williamson can simply bite this
bullet. The idea is that there is nothing wrong with the claim that knowing
how to ride a bicycle involves knowing that an infinite number of proposi-
tions is true because there are other cases where such infinite propositional
knowledge is accepted much more naturally. However plausible, it might be
argued that some people’s mathematical knowledge includes knowledge of an
infinite number of true propositions. Unfortunately, however, even if there
are such cases, this reply does not suffice to block the Correctness Regress.
In order to reject 5’, the premise in question, one would have to show not
only that people may indeed have infinite propositional knowledge, but also
that correct action requires the correct application of infinite propositional
knowledge.
This, I take it, is a bullet nobody should be prepared to bite. Even if,
say, my own mathematical knowledge were to include knowledge of an infinite
number of true propositions, it would still be false that I rely on this knowl-
edge when I solve equations or prove theorems. The direction of explanation
would be exactly the other way around. My solving equations correctly and
proving theorems correctly would make it plausible to attribute such infinite
propositional knowledge to me – if such an attribution is plausible in the first
place.
5 Knowledge-how and methodological knowl-
edge
I have argued that the Correctness Regress is Ryle’s strongest weapon against
Intellectualism and the most plausible statement of his argument. In this
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last part of my paper, I would like to indicate briefly how Ryle draws on this
insight and even suggests a more adequate account of knowledge-how and
one specific form of knowledge-that: methodological knowledge.
But let me begin by remarking that the Correctness Regress does not
entail this. As I use this term, methodological knowledge is a specific form
of knowledge-that: knowledge that such-and-such is a way (or procedure or
method) to F. This is just the kind of knowledge-that Stanley & Williamson
have in mind. However, the Correctness Regress is neutral on the ques-
tion whether or not any knowledge-that, let alone methodological knowl-
edge, plays a role when an actor exercises knowledge-how. The only claim
the argument entails is that if knowledge-that is involved at all, it cannot
be everything. At least some knowledge-how is needed, as well.
Given this insight, one may even go on to claim that a distinction with
such consequences should be abandoned and that both knowledge-that and
knowledge-how should eventually be understood in terms of abilities.22 By
contrast, I will maintain this distinction and draw on Ryle’s own further com-
ments on knowledge-how and one of its paradigm cases in order to propose
a positive account of knowledge-how its relation to methodological knowl-
edge.23
5.1 Ryle on rules and knowledge-how
In the Correctness Regress, Ryle talks about knowledge-how in one of its
paradigmatic roles: the explanation of correct action. Given this, he seems
to suggest that knowledge-how is an ability to do something according to
intersubjective stardards of correctness. But what are these?
Ryle explicitly draws a connection between knowledge-how and one kind
of intersubjective standard of correctness: rules. He writes: “Knowing a rule
is knowledge how.” (Ryle 1945, 7) And he also holds that the converse is
22For example, Stephen Hetherington (2006, 2008) argues along these lines.
23Spelling out the distinction between methodological knowledge and knowledge-how is
a key problem in the current debate; compare, for example, Bengson & Moffett (2007),
Williams (2008), Lihoreau (2008), and Fantl (2008). But this question is often framed
in terms of a distinction between readings of ascriptions of knowledge-how which entail
abilities and those which do not; compare footnote 24 on page 35.
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true. When we credit people with knowing how to do something, he writes:
Part of what is meant is that, when they perform these operations,
they tend to perform them well, i.e. correctly or efficiently or
successfully. Their performances come up to certain standards,
or satisfy criteria. (Ryle 1949, 29)
One of Ryle’s prime examples of knowledge-how is knowledge how to draw
inferences. He cites Lewis Carroll’s tortoise (1895), who fails to grasp the
inference in a modus ponens argument on the basis of an explicit statement
of the corresponding rule of inference (compare Ryle 1945, 6 f.). I take
it that this well-known argument is simply an instance of the Correctness
Regress: To correctly infer ‘q ’ from ‘p’ requires knowledge how to do so. But
if this knowledge consists in nothing but knowledge that the conditional ‘if
p, then q ’ is true, that statement needs to be applied to ‘p’ – and correctly
so. Thus, the question how to correctly infer ‘q ’ from ‘p’ is transformed into
the question how to correctly infer ‘q ’ from ‘p’ and ‘if p, then q ’. But this
question raises the same problem and calls for a further premise to be added
– if ‘p’ and ‘if p, then q ’, then ‘q ’ – and so on ad infinitum.
Ryle expands on this particular instance of the Correctness Regress in
his essay “If ”, “So”, and “Because” (1950), which has been published shortly
after his works on knowledge-how. Here, he uses an analogy in order to spell
out how he understands the notion of correct application.
The Argument “Today is Monday, so tomorrow is Tuesday” is an
application of “if today is Monday, tomorrow is Tuesday”; and it
is in this notion of application that lies the answer to our question
[...]. (Ryle 1950, 328)
Knowing “if p, then q” is, then, rather like being in the possession
of a railway ticket. It is having a licence or warrant to make a
journey from London to Oxford. (Ryle 1950, 329)
Since the ability to draw inferences is one of Ryle’s own examples of knowledge-
how, it is natural to wonder if this analogy carries over to knowledge-how in
general.
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On the one hand, we have the argument “Today is Monday, so tomorrow
is Tuesday” and the statement “If today is Monday, tomorrow is Tuesday”,
and on the other hand we have Hannah’s riding a bicycle correctly and –
what? I propose that the missing element might be something like Stanley &
Williamson’s proposal as a definiens of knowledge-how. It might be Hannah’s
methodological knowledge that doing such-and-such would be a way to ride
a bicycle.
For now, I would like to bracket the exact form of this methodological
knowledge and rely on an intuitive understanding of this notion. Method-
ological knowledge is knowledge how something is done – knowledge that
such-and-such is a way to do it. Then, Ryle’s extended analogy can be
spelled out as follows:
1. I can draw the inference from “Today is Monday” to “Tomorrow is Tues-
day” with or without the conditional statement “If today is Monday,
tomorrow is Tuesday”. But knowing and applying this statement allows
me to state explicitly what I am doing in drawing the inference and to
justify that I am doing it correctly.
2. Hannah can be able to ride a bicycle correctly with or without the
methodological knowledge that doing such-and-such is a way to ride a
bicycle. But having and applying this methodological knowledge allows
her to state explicitly what she is doing in riding a bicycle and to justify
that she is doing it correctly.
Of course, the most obvious and probably best way for Hannah to justify
that she knows how to ride a bicycle is simply to demonstrate this by riding
a bicycle. But we cannot rely on such practical demonstrations as a jus-
tification for knowledge-how in every case. For example, it is much more
convenient for me to justify my knowledge how to extinguish a fire by saying
what I would do in order to do so – by citing methodological knowledge –
than by actually extinguishing a statistically significant number of fires.
Ryle’s extended analogy suggests that to apply methodological knowledge
about how to F is to state explicitly what one does in F-ing and to justify
that one is able to F correctly. Given the Correctness Regress, and contra
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Stanley & Williamson, this cannot be identical with knowledge-how. But
how exactly should we think of their relationship? In the next and final
section of this paper, I will provide a preliminary answer to this question.
5.2 Explicating knowledge-how
I think that methodological knowledge is an interesting and often crucial
kind of knowledge, and that it underlies our correct performances in many
cases. One sometimes knows how to do something partly because one has
methodological knowledge about it – that is, because one knows how it is
done. But it is equally possible to know how something is done without
knowing how to do it. That is, methodological knowledge is neither sufficient
nor necessary for knowledge-how.
For example, I know that forcing my opponent in a game of chess to trade
pieces is a way for me to maintain the upper hand. Partly because of this,
I know how to maintain the upper hand. But, crucially, my methodological
knowledge is not sufficient for my knowledge how to do this. It only translates
into knowledge how to maintain the upper hand in virtue of my knowledge
how to do what to do in order to do so. It is only in virtue of my knowledge
how to force my opponent to trade pieces that my knowledge what to do in
order to maintain the upper hand translates into my knowledge how to do
so.
Let me put this point more abstractly: Sometimes S knows how to F
in virtue of S’s methodological knowledge about F, that is, in virtue of S’s
knowledge that w is a way for them to F. But this is true only in cases where
S also knows how to instantiate w.
This also explains why it is possible for me to know how something is done
without knowing how to do it. That was my second claim: Methodological
knowledge does not imply knowledge-how. I might know that forcing my
opponent to trade pieces is a way for me to maintain the upper hand, but
fail to know how to do so. If I do not know how to force my opponent to trade
pieces, I probably do not know how to maintain the upper hand. At the very
least, I do not know how to do so in virtue of my methodological knowledge
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about forcing a trade of pieces. I might know other ways of maintaining the
upper hand, but this is independent from the methodological knowledge in
question.
The same phenomenon underlies the Skiing case discussed above (com-
pare section 3.2). A ski instructor who knows how to teach others how to
perform a complex stunt, but is unable to perform it himself, does know some-
thing about performing that stunt. But what he possesses is methodological
knowledge rather than knowledge-how.24 He knows that doing such-and-
such is a way to perform the stunt, and he does not know how to perform
the stunt himself precisely because he cannot instantiate that way of per-
forming the stunt. Still, he can employ his methodological knowledge about
performing the stunt in teaching others how to do so. Other things equal,
more methodological knowledge makes for better teaching.
Given that I claim that methodological knowledge is neither necessary nor
sufficient for knowledge-how, one might wonder why methodological knowl-
edge should be of any interest with respect to knowledge-how. This point
about teaching already shows one important connection: In many if not all
cases, it is partly in virtue of a teacher’s methodological knowledge about an
activity F that she is able to teach others how to F.
We can also make a corresponding point about learning: If a student
wants to learn how to F, a very important way to do so is to seek method-
ological knowledge about that activity. In particular, such a student will
look for methodological knowledge which involves ways or methods of doing
things she already knows how to instantiate. If she is successful, she will
have learned how to F because she knows that w is a way to F and because
she can instantiate w.
24It might be argued that sentences of the form “S knows how to F” are ambiguous
between methodological knowledge and knowledge-how, which would explain why some are
tempted to agree that the ski instructor knows how to perform the stunt in some sense; for
discussion, compare Stanley & Williamson (2001), Rumfitt (2003), and Rosefeldt (2004),
among others. However, I think that once the distinction between proper knowledge-how
and methodological knowledge is clarified, “S knows how to F” can be seen to attribute
knowledge-how, while methodological knowledge is attributed by “S knows how F-ing is
done” or “S knows what to do in order to F”. On a related issue, compare footnote 12 on
page 17.
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The Rylean considerations I discussed above even entail a further im-
portant aspect of methodological knowledge. The extended analogy I have
proposed suggests that to apply methodological knowledge about how to F is
to state explicity what one does in F-ing and to justify that one knows how to
F correctly. We are now in a position to unpack this idea. First, I can claim
that doing such-and-such is a way to extinguish a fire and thereby specify
what extinguishing a fire amounts to (or can amount to). Second, I can use
this claim in order to justify that I know how to extinguish a fire. Just like
above, this justification will be successful only if I know how to instantiate
the way to extinguish a fire I have cited. Third, however, methodological
knowledge is also crucial for the fact that knowledge-how is what underlies
the ‘exercises of our intelligence’ we can evaluate in the light of intersub-
jective standards. Methodological knowledge is crucial here because it lets
us understand and discuss which of some candidate actions count as doing
something correctly.
As a simple example, card games can be played correctly or incorrectly.
There are rules governing which cards can be played when and by whom.
But many traditional cardgames come in regional variants. It is therefore a
crucial competence of players of cardgames that they can explicitly discuss
what counts as playing the game correctly. Is playing such a card at such a
point correct or not? Is my way of setting up the rules better or yours? We
can make parallel observations for other instances of knowledge-how. It is
important not only to be able and know how to solve an equation, but also
to be able to discuss what counts as a way of doing so correctly – say, which
methods are appropriate. It is important not only to be able and know how
to falsify a theory, but also to be able to discuss what counts as a way of
doing so correctly – say, which experiment is the right one.
This phenomenon can also be found in the case of conditionals, as the
Rylean analogy from the last section indicates. If I can use conditionals, I
can say that, wonder whether and discuss if certain inferences are correct
ones. Generally speaking, if I understand methodological knowledge, I can
say that, wonder whether and discuss if doing such-and-such qualifies as
doing something correctly. I can talk about that practice in terms of its
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intersubjective standards of correctness.
Taken together, the role of methodological knowledge I have described
is one of explicating knowledge-how. Methodological knowledge can be used
to say what doing something amounts to, which could otherwise merely be
shown by doing it. And it can be used to talk about what does or should
count as doing something correctly. Methodological knowledge lets us become
self-conscious about our knowledge-how – that is, about the things we do
according to intersubjective standards of correctness.
Of course, this is merely a preliminary account of knowledge-how, method-
ological knowledge and their relationship. I think that such a Rylean view
on these notions is very promising,25 but I will not be able to say more about
this in the present context.26
6 Conclusion
I have offered a thorough criticism of Stanley & Williamson’s attempt to es-
tablish Intellectualism against the canonical criticism of Ryle. I have argued
that their positive argument in favour of this view is unsound and that their
view of the relationship between knowledge-how and practical abilities begs
the question. Then, I have pointed out a crucial blind spot in their reading
25One merit of such a Rylean perspective is that it brings out how knowledge-how is
connected to other important issues in the vicinity. The best example for this strength is
that the relationship between knowledge-how and the problem of rule-following, which is
neglected almost entirely in the current debate, comes back into view. Ryle himself writes
that exercises of knowledge-how satisfy criteria, but that “this is not enough. [...] To be
intelligent is not merely to satisfy criteria, but to apply them; to regulate one’s actions
and not merely to be well-regulated.” (Ryle 1949, 29). This thought plays a prominent
role in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (1953) and in the discussion
he has sparked. Arguably, Wittgenstein himself even endorses an argument along the
lines of the Correctness Regress when he shows that we arrive at a “paradox” if we fail to
appreciate “that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation” (1953,
§ 201). However, I will have to leave an adequate assessment of this issue for another
occasion.
26I think that it would be interesting to attempt to spell out such an account of the
role of methodological knowledge in the specification and justification of knowledge-how
in terms of Robert Brandom’s notion of making normative practices explicit (1994, 2008).
But this is only one possibility among several and nothing I have said in this paper depends
on more specifically Brandomian commitments.
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of Ryle’s arguments and shown how this eventually leads to a fatal objection
against their own version of Intellectualism.
Finally, I have drawn on a broader reading of Ryle in order to develop
what might once be a a full-fledged account of knowledge-how and the
species of knowledge-that I call methodological knowledge. I think that
an account along these lines would enrich the debate sparked by Stanley
& Williamson’s article. It has been neglected that the Correctness Regress is
Ryle’s strongest weapon against Intellectualism and that Ryle himself says
more about knowledge-how by saying more about one of his prime examples
of knowledge-how, drawing inferences. A more fully worked-out Rylean ac-
count will hopefully become an interesting contender in the current debate.27
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